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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-
AUTOMATIC REVERSION OF LAND TO GRANTOR
UPON USE BY NON-WHITES
Petitioner, Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission, sought a
declaratory judgment determining the validity of a reverter clause
which limited the use of land granted for a park to members of the
white race only. The superior court found the clause valid. On ap-
peal, held, affirmed. A provision in a deed that the estate shall term-
inate by its own limitation and automatically revert to the grantor
upon use by non-whites will operate without judicial enforcement by
the state courts; therefore, non-whites seeking to use the park will
not be denied equal protection of the laws through the operation of
the reversion. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer,
242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied sub nora. Leeper v.
Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n, 76 Sup. Ct. 469 (1956).
Racial restrictions on the sale and use of land were generally upheld
as a proper exercise of the autonomy inherent in the ownership of
land' until 1948, when the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,2
held that specific enforcement of a private agreement restricting the
use of land to a single race constitutes state action violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Barrows
v. Jackson 3 the Court expanded the state action concept of the Shelley
case, holding that awarding damages at law for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant is unconstitutional state action. As a result of
these decisions, the effectiveness of such a restriction was made to de-
pend on voluntary compliance by the contracting parties.
4
1. See Annot., A.L.R.2d 466, 474-77 (1949). Though some courts ruled
that racial restrictions are invalid restraints on alienation or violative
of public policy, prior to the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), only one court found a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1892).
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948), followed in Kraemer v. Shelley, 358 Mo. 364, 214
S.W.2d 525 (1948). In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the Court rendered
a similar decision as to the District of Columbia, on the ground of federal
public policy.
3. 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
4. So long as the purposes of the agreements are effectuated by voluntary
compliance with their terms, there is no state action and the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment have not been violated; it is not unlawful to en-
force racial restrictions unless the method by which they are enforced con-
travenes the Federal Constitution. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 261 (1953). In Claremont Improvement
Club, Inc. v. Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948), declaratory
relief to establish the validity of a racially restrictive covenant was refused
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The instant case raises the question whether a state court's taking
cognizance of an automatic reversion of land to the grantor upon use
by non-whites constitutes unconstitutional state action.5 The North
Carolina court found no state action involved in the operation of a
possibility of reverter which returned an estate in fee to the grantor
by its own limitation, without action by the grantor and without ju-
dicial enforcement by a state court.6 The court further noted that
denying the operation of the reverter would deprive the grantor of
an interest in property without the due process of law guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. 7
The determinable fee, born in medieval England to fit a situation
peculiar to the times, is a common-law estate in land created in the
grantee until a specified event occurs, upon which the "seisin flies back"
automatically to the grantor.8 While closely akin to a fee simple sub-
ject to a condition subsequent and a fee simple with restrictive
covenants running with the land, the determinable fee differs from
them in two major respects: (1) the reversion operates by its own
limitation to revest a fee simple absolute in the grantor,9 and (2)
the grantor retains a property right in the possibility of reverter within
the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.10
on the ground that such covenants are not unconstitutional insofar as volun-
tary adherence to the terms is concerned, but are merely unenforceable by the
state judicial process. See, also, Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C.
1950); Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 2d 703, 204 P.2d 7 (1949); Matthews v.
Andrade, 87 Cal. App. 2d 906, 198 P.2d 66 (1948); Tovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393,
82 N.E. 441 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 191 Md. 707, 62 A.2d 602 (1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158
(1952); Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949); Correll v. Earley,
205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951), 5 VAND. L. REv. 634 (1952); Clifton v.
Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
5. This problem was anticipated in 2 VAND. L. REv. 119, 122 (1948). See
also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 466, 473, 474 (1949), commenting that a limitation upon
the estate granted may accomplish purposes which could not be obtained
otherwise.
6. Instant case, 88 S.E.2d at 123.
7. Ibid.
8. For discussion of the determinable fee, see AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 2.6 (Casner ed. 1952). The estate is variously referred to as a fee simple
subject to a possibility of reverter, fee simple determinable, qualified fee
simple, or fee on limitation. Apparently it exists in all the states except
South Carolina, and possibly Pennsylvania. See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §
158 (abd. ed., Zollman 1940); 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 178 (1936).
9. The possibility of reverter is an interest in land which terminates auto-
matically "without any act on her [the grantor's) part." Mott v. Danville
Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N.E. 927, 930 (1889). See Brown v. Hobbs, 132
Md. 559, 104 Atl. 283, 285 (1918); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 217 (3d ed.,
Jones 1939). The estate may be created by the use of appropriate words in
the deed of conveyance, e.g., "'until' a certain event takes place," or "'while'
or 'so long as' an existing state of things shall endure." Id. § 218. In other
words the grantee or devisee of a parcel of land retains his interest therein
only so long as a specified event does not take place. The limitation subjects
the remote grantee to the same liability as to termination of the estate as
is sustained by the original grantee. Riner v. Falls, 176 Ky. 575, 195 S.W.
1102 (1917); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 220 (3d ed., Jones 1939).
10. The interest retained in the grantor is subject to various interpretations.
The general rule is that a possibility of reverter is an existing reversionary
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Heretofore state action has been conceived'-to -be positive action
which could fairly be attributed to the state; this does not include
private conduct, however discriminatory." Extension of the state
action doctrine to the situation in the instant case would require a
finding that the state acts in taking judicial recognition of a right of
ownership in fee; that passive recognition by a state court of a fait
accompli constitutes state action quite as much as judicial enforce-
ment of a right of action. Legislation allowing a grantor to condition
the future use of land upon race would seem more clearly within the
scope of the Shelley doctrine; yet it is well settled that state enforce-
ment of a common-law practice is state action quite the same as en-
forcement of legislation embodying the practice.'2 Since an individual
may transfer land only by grace of, the state and in the manner pre-
scribed by the state, it could be argued that the designation of a
method of conveyancing through legislation or judicial approval of a
common-law practice amounts to state control of private action,
which is state action.
The argument could be made that state sanction of a reversion of
title upon use of land by non-whites operates to deprive colored
citizens of rights entitled to positive protection under the fourteenth
amendment. More than mere voluntary adherence to a private agree-
ment, the operation of a reversion based upon race constitutes an effec-
tive restraint on the use of land by non-whites. Failure to prevent
the revesting of title might be termed "passive state action" or "state
sanction" of a discriminatory practice. The argument that the owner
of the reversion may not be deprived of a property right without due
process of law is met by the long-established rule that whenever a
determinable fee is based on an invalid limitation, the limitation is in-
operative and the estate becomes an absolute fee simple.
13
interest. See LEACH, FUTURE INTERESTS, (2d ed. 1940); 1 AMERICAN LAW Or
PROPERTY § 4.18 n.8 (Casner ed. 1952). The interest is in the nature of a
property right. Institute for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women,
244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923). It is marketable. See Strong v. Shatto,
45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919); Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33
So. 2d 641 (1948). However, a possibility of reverter is not an estate in land
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 216 (abd. ed., Zollman 1940); 19 Am. JUR., Estates
§ 32 (1939). It is a vested interest. GRAY, Tm RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §
113.3 (4th ed. 1915). Contra, it may be abolished by legislative act because
it is a mere expectation of property in the future, not a vested right. Prall v.
Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280, 18 A.L.R. 992 (1921).
11. "State action, as that phrase is understood for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). "State action of every kind . . . . State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings"
is subject to review under the fourteenth amendment. Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 317 (1883). Moreover, the fourteenth amendment "erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory." State action in-
cludes "only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
12. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S., 252 (1941); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
13. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.83 (Casner ed. 1952). See, e.g., Mc-
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In any event, it would seem that a racial restriction in the terms
of a grant to a public park must be viewed in the light of recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court indicating that segregation of publicly
owned recreational facilities violates the equal protection clause. 14
Assuming that the operation of a determinable fee does not involve
state action, 5 the utility of the device insofar as public recreational
facilities are concerned seems dubious. If non-whites may not be
barred by the state or municipality, reversion of title to the grantor
could not be avoided.
Gahon v. McGahon, 84 Ind. App. 500, 151 N.E. 627 (1926); Duval v. Duval, 316
Mo. 626, 291 S.W. 448 (1927); Gard v. Mason, 169 N.C. 507, 86 S.E. 302 (1915);
Ruhland v. King, 154 Wis. 545, 143 N.W. 681 (1913). See generally, Wade,
Legal Status of Property Transferred Under an Illegal Transaction, 41 ILL.
L. REV. 487 (1946).
14. City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712, af'd, 281 U.S. 704 (1930);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955).
15. Initially, it may be found that the estate created is not a determinable
fee. Alternative results which could be urged under local law are:
(1) The particular reverter clause creates a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent or a fee simple absolute with a restrictive covenant. See LEACH
FUTURE INTERESTS 21 (2d ed. 1940); 19 AM. JUR., Estates §§ 27, 32 (1939); 5
HARV. L. REV. 271 n.89 (1940). The court may achieve a desired result, ex-
cept where the type of estate is specifically set out, on rules of construction.
See 19 AM. JuR., Estates § 65 (1939). The reluctance of the courts to find a
fee simple determinable makes them rare. Some courts virtually write them
out of the law. See Savannah School Dist. v. McLeod, 290 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1955).
If, of course, the reverter in the instant case were construed to be a right of
entry for condition broken or a covenant, it would require state action for
enforcement, under the Shelley rule.
(2) An attempt to create a fee simple determinable creates a fee simple
absolute. Many writers argue that the Statute Quia Emptores abolished
the fee simple determinable. Since that statute prevents the relation of
tenure between the grantor and the grantee such as would entitle him to
resume possession, there is no principle upon which the right of automatic
reverter may be supported. The fee simple determinable exists today as a
result of a misleading statement of the common law by Lord Coke. KALES,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 302 (2d ed. 1936); SANDERS, USES 208 (5th ed. 1844); 1
SnMs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 177-78 (1936). However, its existence is judicially
recognized today. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 158 (abd. ed., Zolman 1940).
Also see Vance, Rights of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores, 36 YALE
L.J. 593 (1927).
(3) A limitation to a single race is an unreasonable restraint on alienation,
and hence is invalid. It is generally conceded that racial restrictions on use
or occupancy do not impose improper restraints on alienation of land. Meade
v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330 (1938); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 426, 447-48
(1948); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 180, 181 (1946). There is, however, a decided
split of authority as to whether a restriction on transfer of title is an improper
restraint. See Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952) (reciprocal
restrictive covenant invalid as much as unenforceable because unlawful
restraint on alienation). Contra, Re Noble and Wolfe, [1949] Ont. R. 503,
4 D.L.R. 375, rev'd sub nom. Noble v. Alley, [1951] Can. Sup. Ct. 64, 1 D.L.R.
321. See Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925); 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 1345 (3d ed., Jones 1939); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 466, 486-88
(1949); 2 VAND. L. REV. 119 (1948). Decisions are equally divided as to
whether restraints on alienation in forfeiture form to a particular group of
persons are invalid as contrary to public policy. Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 513, 205.
S.W. 217 (1918). Contra, Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680,
186 Pac. 596 (1919); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152,
183 Pac. 410 (1919); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925)
See 6 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 26.34 (Casner ed. 1952).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN-
POTENTIALITY FOR WATER POWER DEVELOPMENT
AS ELEMENT OF COMPENSATION
A condemnation proceeding was instituted by the United States to
acquire property along a navigable stream for a power project.' The
district court awarded compensation to the landowner based in part
on consideration of the availability of the land for water power de-
velopment.2 In affirming the award, the court-of appeals rejected
the Government's contention that compensation should be limited to
the property's value for agricultural and timber purposes.3 Held,
(5-4), reversed. Because of the "dominant servitude ' 4 of the United
States in the flow of navigable waters, the Government is not required
to compensate riparian landowners for an increment of value in land
which is due solely to the flowing of a navigable stream. United States
v. Twin City Power Company, 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
The requirement of the fifth amendment that private property shall
not be taken 5 for public use without just compensation has normally
been fulfilled in condemnation proceedings by awarding the landowner
the fair market value of his property.6 The courts have disallowed the
particular value to the taker? as an element of market value unless
such an adaptability would actually increase value on the open market
apart from the need of the taker.8 With respect to riparian land there
1. The stated purpose of the project was the improvement of navigation,
since Congress could not dam a navigable stream only for power. The courts
will not question the purpose of the taking under eminent domain, such as
a stated purpose of improving navigation. United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Missouri
ex rel. Camden County v. Union Elec. Light and Power Co., 42 F.2d 692 (D.
Mo. 1930); Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (M.D. Ala.
1922).
2. United States v. 3,928.09 Acres of Land, 114 F. Supp. 719 (W.D.S.C.
1953).
3. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954).
4. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
5. Property is considered taken when the owner is deprived of its use.
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). In United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946), it was held that the noise and glare caused by aircraft
flying at low altitude constituted a taking, because the landowner was de-
prived of its use as a chicken farm.
6. United States ex rel. TVA v. Southern States Power Co., 33 F. Supp.
519 (W.D.N.C. 1940).
7. Among the various elements of fair market value included in awarding
compensation have been: the value for canal and lock purposes, United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); the value
of growing trees, Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Util. Corp.,
179 Ark. 1029, 18 S.W.2d 1028 (1929); the value of mineral rights, Hollister
v. Cox, 131 Conn. 523, 41 A.2d 93 (1945); the value for special uses such
as water power development, Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72
N.E.2d 549 (1947); and the value of improvements, Banner Milling Co. v.
State, 240 N.Y. 533, 148 N.E. 668 (1925).
8. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934); City of New York v. Sage,
239 U.S. 57 (1915); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229
U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. -Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884);
1956 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
is a further consideration. By virtue of the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution 9 the Government has complete control over
navigable streams for purposes of regulating and improving navigation
and may extinguish riparian rights in exercising this dominant serv-
itude.'0 Owners of land on navigable streams are not entitled to
compensation for injuries which are merely incidental" to the proper
exercise of the governmental power. 12 In the case of such a taking,
it is reasoned that the individual owns nothing and therefore loses
nothing. The problem in the instant case is that the condemned
property had an actual value as a potential site for the development of
water power, but this value hinged upon access to a stream over which
the Government had the right of exclusive control.
13
In 1913, the Supreme Court in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co.'4 unanimously held that because a riparian owner
had no property right in the stream and no right to construct the works
necessary to develop water power, the owner was not entitled to
compensation for the value of the land as a site for water power
development. This element of value in the land was attributed solely
to the flow of the stream. The majority opinion in the instant case
utilized the same rationale. Quoting with approval the statement
"'that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of
private ownership is inconceivable'" the Court refused to allow com-
pensation by the Government for an increment of value which it has
power to grant or withhold as it chooses.' 5 In addition, the Court
indicated that such an award would be based upon the unique value
of the property to the taker, in contravention of well-established
principles of valuation.
16
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1879). In the latter case, the Court re-
marked that compensation is not diminished because the purpose of the taker
was coincidental with the most valuable use of the property.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. "All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for
the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title
to the shore and submerged soil is in the various States and individual owners
under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation
created in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution." Gibson v.
United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897).
11. E.g., a denial of access to a navigable stream is an incidental injury.
12. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913);
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green
Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 142 U.S. 254 (1891). But riparian owners on non-
navigable streams are entitled to compensation for incidental injuries. United
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
13. The exercise of the Government's right requires clear authorization
by Congress. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 has not abolished
private proprietary rights existing under state law to use the waters of a
navigable stream for power purposes. Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954).
14. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
15. Instant case at 228. Licensing for development of water power is
governed by the Federal Water Power Act. 41 STAT. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 791, 797-814 (1941).
16. "[T]he question is what has the owner lost, not what the taker gained."
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
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The dissenting Justices would reject the theory that the govern-
ment's servitude permits it to pay less compensation than-any-other
condemnor. Support for this position was sought in a holding 'of, the
Chandler-Dunbar case which permitted value for canal arid lbek pur-
poses to be included in the compensation for riparian land.Y:However,
this element of value was' not regarded in that case as attributable
to the flow of the stream and the government's "dominant servitude"
was therefore not a consideration. In discussing the question of in-
cluding a value to the taker in market value, the dissenting opinion
pointed out that just compensation should include the value of the
property for all of the reasonable uses which are not too remote and
which would enter into market value in the absence of the needs of
the condemnor.18 -
It may be argued that the approach of the majority in the instant
case reflects a progressive policy of facilitating the development of
public works.19 Certainly it is a logical corollary to the principle that
the Government may control riparian access to navigable streams.
However, one might question the use of the navigation powers under
the commerce clause to superimpose a condition upon the "just com-
pensation" mandate of the fifth amendment. Under the resulting dual
definition2 0 of just compensation, the identity of the condemnor may
require the exclusion of a rnormal element of market value and may
occasion actual loss to the owner of condemned property. It may be
significant, in view of the increasing activity of the federal government
in the power and flood control fields, that the unanimity -of the Court
in the Chandler-Dunbar decision wasnot repeated in the instant case.
CONTRACTS-PLACE OF MAKING-ACCEPTANCE
BY INSTANTANEOUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
Plaintiff, an English company, sent a counter-offer for the purchase
of copper cathodes from London to the Amsterdam agent of the de-
fendant American corporation. Acceptance of the counter-offer by the
agent was received by plaintiff in London. The communication be-
tween the companies was by telex.' In this action for breach of the
17. 229 U.S. at 75.
18. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1879).
19. 65 YALE L. J. 96 (1955).
20. Compensation was allowed for dam site value when the taking was not
done by the federal government. Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro,
335 U.S. 359 (1948); Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65
F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1933).
1. This equipment consists of a teleprinter in the offices of the parties
operated like a typewriter. The messages dispatched in one country are
almost instantaneously received and typed in the other country.
1956]
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contract plaintiff contended for purposes of jurisdiction that the
contract was made in London, and sought leave to serve process on
defendant in New York.2 Service of process was granted and defendant
appealed. Held, affirmed. When a contract is negotiated by in-
stantaneous means of communication it is not complete until the ac-
ceptance is received by the offeror, and the contract is made at the
place where the acceptance is received. Entores Ld. v. Miles Far
East Corp., [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. 48 (C.A.).
A contract is deemed entered into at the place where the last act
necessary to its formation is performed. 3 If acceptance is made im-
mediately after the offer when the parties are together no question
arises as to the place of contract.4 When the offer and acceptance are
not simultaneous and the parties are separated the place of contract
is generally held to be where the reply is mailed5 or delivered to a
telegraph company.6 However, in Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United
States7 a divided Court of Claims recently rejected this view and
followed the minority of courts which hold that the posting of a letter
does not constitute an acceptance since the offeree under the postal
regulations may withdraw the letter of acceptance from the mail.
There is a conflict of opinion as to the place of contract when the
means of communication involved are instantaneous, such as telephone
or telex service.8 The instant case,9 one of first impression, and the
2. R.S.C., Ord. 11, r. 1, provides that service out of the jurisdiction of a
writ of summons may be allowed (e) to enforce a contract (i) "made within
the jurisdiction." As cited in instant case, [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. at 49.
3. Hogue-Kellogg Co. v. G. L. Webster Canning Co., 22 F.2d 384 (4th Cir.
1927); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 74 (1932).
4. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 97 (rev. ed. 1936).
5. Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 390 (1850); Adams v.
Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §§ 64, 67 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 81 (rev. ed. 1936). The
offeror may impose the condition that the acceptance actually be received.
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 88 (rev. ed. 1936).
6. Garrettson v. North Atchinson Bank, 47 Fed. 867 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1891);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wheeler, 114 Okla. 161, 245 Pac. 39, 47 A.L.R. 156
(1926).
7. 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. C1. 1955), 7 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 103. The decision
is open to criticism for erroneously implying that a supposed change in the
postal regulations permitting withdrawal became effective for the first time in
1948. Actually this regulation, which is the basis of the minority view, has
been in effect since 1913. See Dick v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 703, 82 F.
Supp. 326, 329 (1949); Guardian Nat'l. Bank v. Huntington County State Bank,
206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933); Traders' Nat'l. Bank v. First Nat'l. Bank,
142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920). The court in the Tool Co. case could have
reached the same result by applying the majority view which recognizes
that the offeror may impose the condition that the acceptance actually be
received. See note 5 supra. The Government's invitation to the offeror to
submit a bid, which of course became a part of the contract, contained
language that could be construed as such a condition.
8. Compare Cardon v. Hampton, 21 Ala. 438, 109 So. 176 (1926); Bank of
Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., 141 Cal. 314, 74 Pac. 855 (1903); Dudley A. Tyng &
Co. v. Converse, 180 Mich. 195, 146 N.W. 629 (1914), with RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 65 (1932). See criticism of the above cases in 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 82 (rev. ed. 1936).
9. Instant case, [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. at 50.
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Restatement of Contracts0 (without comment) adopt the view that
acceptance by telephone is the same as an oral acceptance when the
parties are in the presence of each other and a contract is made at the
place where notice of acceptance is received by the offeror. The
majority of courts in the United States seem to treat contracts ne-
gotiated by telephone in the same way as postal communications and
hold the place of contract to be where the acceptor speaks."
As a major premise for its holding in the instant case the court
relied on the long discredited proposition that there must be a
"meeting of the minds" in order to form a contract, 2 and deduced as
a corollary that actual notification of acceptance to the offeror is a
prerequisite to the existence of a contract. 3 Since notification was
received by the offeror in London, the court found that to be the
place of the contract's formation. The opposite results in cases involv-
ing contracts entered into by mail or telegraph were distinguished
by the court as exceptions to the general rule requiring actual notice.
These so-called exceptions were said to have resulted from the necessi-
ties of commercial expediency and convenience, in order to bring
about an early conclusion of negotiations with a resulting consumma-
tion of a contract. The court stressed the similarity between telex com-
munications and contracts negotiated by the parties in the presence
of each other and noted that it was unnecessary to adopt the rule
of convenience which accounted for the postal and telegraph excep-
tions.
The problem of instantaneous communication and its relation to
the place of contract has presented itself with frequent significance
in the determination of jurisdiction and the law to be applied in the
enforcement of the contract. 4 In view of the development of more
mechanical and instantaneous means of communication it is to be
regretted that the international commercial world is confronted with
the conflicting rules which now exist in the United States and
England.
INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY OMNIBUS CLAUSE-
COVERAGE OF SUB-PERMITTEE
Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident, recovered
judgment against the driver and thereupon brought an action against
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 65 (1932).
11. Cases cited note 5 supra.
12. FEasoN, RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS 102 (1949).
13. Instant case, [1955] 3 Weekly L.R. at 54.
14. United States v. Bushwick Mills, Inc., 165 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1947);
Cowdin Grocery Co. v. Early-Foster Co., 237-S.W. 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921);
Cuero Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Feeders' Supply Co., 203 S.W. 79 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918); Planters' Cotton Oil Co. v. Whitesboro Cotton Oil Co., 146 S.W.
225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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the-owner's insurer under an omnibus clause in the owner's automobile
liability insurance policy.1 The;owner's son had paid the greater part
of the price of the automobile, but the purchase was made in the
father's name because the son was a minor. The father gave the son
permission to use the automobile as his own, and the son lent the
automobile to the person who was driving at the time of the accident.
The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the
driver was using the automobile with the owner's permission at the
time of the accident and thus was within the scope of the omnibus
clause. On appeal, held, reversed. Permission of the -named insured
sufficient to bring a person driving his automobile within the coverage
of an omnibus clause may be implied; however, a grant of permission
to his son to use the automobile as the son's own does not include an
inmplied permission to lend the automobile to third persons. Hamm v.
Camerota, 290 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1955).
The usual automobile liability insurance policy today contains an
"omnibus clause" purporting to insure persons using the, -named in-
sured's automobile with his permission. 2 The clause involved in the
instant case represents the usual form. Although such clauses are
'standardized for the most part, there is sometimes a difference in
wording. Instead of "permission" some clauses use the word "consent."
"Permission" and "consent" convey much the same meaning; al-
though "6onsent" may be more active or affirmative in its meaning
than "permission" this distinction has not been given much weight by
the courts.3 Where the named insured expressly gives authority to
his permiiftee to let third persons use his automobile, the courts are in
agreement that a sub-permittee becomes an insured under the terms of
the omnibus A.clause.4 They are also in agreement where the insured
expressly forbids the original permittee to let anyone else use his
automobile. Under such circumstances a third person would not be
covered.5
Where the insured is silent-neither giving nor denying permission
to lend the automobile-the courts are in conflict, the majority holding
1. "Definition of 'Insured.' With respect to the insurance for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured'
includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the
automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use
thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured
or with his permission." Instant case, 290 P.2d at 716.
2. See 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTicE § 4353 (1942), concerning
states in which an omnibus clause is required by statute.
3. American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 605, 45 S.W.2d 52 (1932).
4. Mercer Cas. Co. v. Kreamer, 105 Ind. App. 358, 11 N.E.2d 84 (1937); Odden
v. Union Indemnity Co., 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59 (1930).
5. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Lyle,-81 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1936); Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex. 1935); Cocos v. American Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 302 Ill. App. 442, 24 N.E.2d 75 (1939); Clemons v. Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co., 18 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 1944).
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that a sub-p~rmittee is not covered.6 A minority of courts have found
that an implied permission to lend the automobile is sufficient to
extend coverage. When a permittee extends the use of the car to a
third person either an agency or bailment relation is created. The
courts which follow the minority view are somewhat more ready to
imply authority to lend the car in the case of agency than in the case
of bailment. Some courts have found an implied permission by
acquiescence where the named insured knew that the original per-
mittee had in the past permitted others to drive the automobile.
7
Following the agency theory, other courts have held that a sub-
permittee is covered if he serves some purpose, benefit, or advantage
of the original permittee. Thus permission has been found where the
original permittee was being driven in the automobile by the sub-
permittee,8 where the sub-permittee was going to get medicine for
the original permittee who was ill,9 and where a garage repairman
lent a substitute automobile to a customer without restriction to be
used in place of a family car which the repairman knew the custbmees
wife was accustomed to drive.'0
An implied permission in the instant case would have to be found
in the broad grant of authority to the son to -use the automobile as
his own. Since it would be difficult to conceive of a broader grant
of authority, the implication of the decision is that authority of a
permittee to lend the automobile cdn never be inferred from the
broad language of the initial permission alone. In most cases a finding
of implied permission to the original permittee to lend the insured's
car has been based on circumstances other than the broad scope of the
initial permission."
To allow any person, whether acquainted with the named insured
or not, to be protected by the terms of an omnibus clause would im-
pose an unfair burden on the insurer. 2 The insurer has signified its
6. Majority: Samuels v. American Automobile Ins.- Co., 150 F.2d 221 (10th
Cir. 1945); Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co., 35 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1929);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hodsdon, 92 N.H. 233, 29 A.2d 782 (1942); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Marcoux, 91 N.H. 450, 21 A.2d 161 (1941); Cronan v. Travelers In-
demnity Co., 126 N.J.L. 56, 18 A.2d 13 (1941).
Minority: United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 190
F.2d 404 (1oth Cir. 1951); Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App.
1939); Boyer v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359, 178 N.E. 523
(1931).
7. Tomasetti v. Maryland Cas. Co., 117 Conn. 505, 169 Ati. 54 (1933);
Schimke v. Mutual Automobile Ins..-Co., 266 Wis. 517, 64 N.W.2d 195'(1954).
8. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Zurn, 87 F.2d 988 (7th Cir, 1937); Jonesir:.
New York Cas. Co., 23 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 1938); American Employere"
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 93 N.H. 101, 36 A.2d 284 (1944). -
9. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 89 N.H. 95, 193 Atl. 233 (1937).
10. Drake v. General Ace., Fire & Life Assurance Co., 88 Ga. App. 408, 77
S.E.2d 71 (1953).
11. But see Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App.-.1939); Boyer
v. Massachusetts Bonding &.'Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 359, i.I .., .523 .(1931),,
12. See APPLEMANy AUTJOMO6BILE LimiTIY INsTiRANcE 122-23 -(1938)."
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confidence in the selection made by the named insured but not that
made by his permittee. Thus the decision in the instant case seems
sound in that the court would not find an implied blanket authority to
lend the automobile without the named insured's knowledge or prior
consent. Since the amount of risk forms the basis of the premiums
charged, ordinarily the insurer has a right to assume that the risk
undertaken will not be enlarged.13
INSURANCE-INSURER'S RIGHT OF SUBROGATION-
WAIVER BY REFUSAL TO PAY CLAIM
Plaintiff's ambulance, worth $6,000 and insured for $3,000, was
destroyed by fire allegedly caused by the negligence of a third party.
After denial of his claim by defendant, plaintiff released the tortfeasor
from all liability in consideration of $3,000, reserving any right of
action he might have against defendant. In plaintiff's suit under the
policy, defendant demurred on the ground that its right of subrogation
had been destroyed by the release of the tortfeasor in breach of a
stipulation in the policy of insurance that the insured would do
nothing to prejudice such right. The lower court sustained the demur-
rer and plaintiff took a non-suit. Held, reversed. An insurer's refusal
to pay an obviously valid claim when filed constitutes a waiver of his
right of subrogation so that its destruction cannot be asserted as a
defense to an action by the insured. Poole v. William Penn Fire
Insurance Co., 84 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1955).
It is a generally accepted rule of law that an insurer, upon payment
of a loss to the insured, is subrogated to the insured's rights against
the tortfeasor to the extent of such payment.' Since it is derived
from the insured's claim against the responsible party, the insurer's
right of subrogation will be defeated by the insured's full release of
the tortfeasor. 2 Further, the release will be a defense to an action by
the insured against the insurer if payment has not been made under
the policy,3 and in many instances, will require reimbursement of the
13. For a general collection of cases: see 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE 156-59 (1942); 6 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 595-625
(1945); Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1195-1223 (1946).
1. Garrison v. Memphis Ins. Co., 60 U.S. (19 How.) 312 (1856); Liverpool
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 247 Fed. 16 (6th Cir. 1918); Underwood v.
Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64
Utah 395, 231 Pac. 445 (1924); 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
4051 (1942); 8 CoucH, INSURANCE § 1997 (1931).
2. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312 (1886); Harter v.
American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1932); Maryland Motor
Car Ins. Co. v. Haggard, 168 S.W. 1011, 1013 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (dictum);
6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4092 (1942).
3. Auto Owners' Protective Exchange v. Edwards, 82 Ind App. 558, 136
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insurer by the insured if payment has been made.4 The right is an
equitable one and rests on the principle that the person primarily
responsible for the loss should bear the consequences of his wrongful
act.5 Where the party asserting it has by his conduct made it inequita-
ble to do so, the courts will not enforce the right. Thus, the right has
been deemed waived by contract when the insurance policy provides
for subrogation if the insurer claims that the loss was caused by
negligence of a third party, and, at the time of payment, the insurer
makes no such claim.6 The right has also been deemed waived by a
refusal to join with the insured in a suit against the tortfeasor after
payment is made under the policy,7 and by a consistent refusal to pay
an obviously valid claim which forces the insured to sue the tortfeasor.8
In the last situation, the courts have allowed recovery by the insured
against the insurer even though the insured had settled with and
released the tortfeasor from all liability. It is to be noted, however,
that the insurer is not required to act with undue haste in order to
avoid losing his right of subrogation. Only inequitable conduct will
result in a waiver.9
In the instant case, the insurer, by refusing to pay the obviously
valid claim, required the insured to sue either the insurer or the
tortfeasor and neither course of action would have given him what he
contracted for, i.e., indemnity free from vexatious litigation. The
insurer lost its right of subrogation, but had the claim been paid when
filed and when in good conscience it should have been paid, the
insurer and the insured could have joined in suit against the tortfeasor
and placed the whole loss where it properly belonged. The result
of these rulings is to place good faith compliance with the terms of the
contract on the insurer.'0
N.E. 577 (1922); Packham v. German Fire Ins. Co., 91 Md. 515, 46 Atl. 1066
(1900); Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600, 111 So. 584 (1927); Brown v.
Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co, 83 Vt. 161, 74 AtI. 1061 (1910) (dictum).
4. However, if insured has acted in good faith towards insurer, the amount
of reimbursement may only be the amount recovered from both tortfeasor
and insurer which exceeds the actual loss sustained by the insured. See,
29 Am. JuR., Insurance § 1346 (1940) and cases cited thereunder.
5. 8 Couci1, INSURANCE § 1996 (1931).
6. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 621, 183 S.E. 799 (1935);
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 49 Ga. App. 731, 176 S.E. 690 (1934); Fire
Ass'n v. Schellenger, 84 N.J. Eq. 464, 94 Atl. 615 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915). See
Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N.W. 849 (1932).
7. Sun Ins. Office v. Hohenstein, 128 Misc. 870, 220 N.Y. Supp. 386 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1927); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Confer, 158 Pa. 598, 28 Atl. L53 (1893).
8. Weber v. United Hardware & Implement Mut. Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d
456 (1948); Roberts v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 376 Pa. 99, 101 A.2d 747 (1954);
Powers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 309, 57 S.E.2d 638 (1950).
9. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. v. Haggard, 168 S.W. 1011 (Tex Civ. App.
1914).
10. That the insurer is not overly concerned with its right of subrogation
i3 shown by surveys indicating that collision insurance premiums are calcu-
lated on an indemnity basis, recovery by the insurer on a subrogated claim
being unexpected. CROBOUGH AND REDDING, CASUALTY INSURANCE 309 (1928);
48 MICH. L. REv. 1205 (1950).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-BORROWED SERVANT
DOCTRINE-CONTRACT AS PROOF OF ASSUMPTION
OF CONTROL
In a contract with the Bethlehem Steel Company, defendant trucking
company agreed to transport steel from a river dock to a bridge site.
The contract specifically provided that Bethlehem would unload the
steel after its arrival. During an unloading process the driver of
one of defendant's trucks negligently loosened the chains that bound
the steel to the truck, causing a steel girder to fall and injure plaintiff,
an employee of Bethlehem. Bethlehem's foreman had taken charge of
the, unloading and employees of Bethlehem, *including plaintiff, had
already boarded the truck to start the unloading process. In plaintiff's
suit to recover damages, the trial court held as a matter of law that
for the period in which the accident occurred defendant's truck
driver had become an employee of Bethlehem, and, therefore, defend-
ant was not liable for the driver's negligence. The appellate division
reversed on the ground that the question should have been given to
the jury. On appeal, held, affirmed. The contract and the exercise of
control by Bethlehem's foreman do not constitute conclusive proof
that defendant surrendered control of the driver to Bethlehem. Stone
v. Bigley Bros. Inc., 309 N.Y. 132, 127 N.E.2d 913 (1955).
Although it has been held that a person may at one time be the
servant of two masters who are not joint employers, provided service
to one does not involve abandonment of service to the other,' the
general rule is that when a servant is loaned for the performance of
a specific act or series of acts and control of the servant is temporarily
released to a new master, the new master assumes responsibility for
the acts of the servant done within the scope of his employment.2 This
rule is derived from the "borrowed servant" doctrine.3 Generally,
whether an original employee remained the master of his borrowed
servant is a question of fact.4 Of the factors to be considered,
1. See Butler v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P.2d 703 (1937); King v.
Emerson, 10 Cal. App. 414, 288 Pac. 1099 (1930); Meridian Taxicab Co. V.
Ward, 184 Miss. 499, 186 So. 636, 120 A.L.R. 1346 (1939); Gordon v. S. M.
Byers Motor Car Co., 309 Pa. 453, 164 Atl. 334 (1932); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 226 (1933); FERSON, PRINCILES Or AGENCY § 35 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 284 U.S. 305 (1932); Byrne v.
Kansas City, Ft. S. & M.R.R., 61 Fed. 605 (6th Cir. 1894); Pennsylvania Cas.
Co. v. Elkins, 70 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1947); Indemnity ins. Co. v. Malisfski,
46 F. Supp. 454 (D. Md. 1942); Blakely v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.,.'67 Ga. App. 795, 21 S.E.2d 339 (1942); Sanford v. Keef, 140 Tenn., 368,
204 S.W. 1154 (1918).
3. See, e.g., Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 284 U.S. 305 (1932); McFarland
vi. Dixie Mach. & Equipment Co., 348 Mo. 341, 153 S.W.2d 67, 136 A.L.R. 516
(1941); RESTATEMEkT, AGENCY § 227 (1933)'; Smith, Scope of the Business:
The B6riroTbih Servafit Problem, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1940).
4., See, e.g., Leb Moor Contracting Co. v. Bianton, 49 Ariz. 130, 65 P.24 35
(1937); Ryder v. Plumley, 138 Fla. 378, 189 So. 422 (1939); Balaus v. Lexing-
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the most important is the division of control agreed upon by the
parties.5 Should all the facts indicate that complete control of the
servant was surrendered and that the servant was engaged solely in
the furtherance of the business of the new master, the new master is
liable for the torts of the servant under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.6 Conversely, if the general employer retains control of the
servant while he is in the service of another, the general employer re-
mains liable for any injuries the servant may cause while acting within
the scope of his employment.7 When control is shared, the person who
had control of the particular act which caused the injury is liable.8
However, there is a strong presumption that when only partial con-
trol is surrendered the general employment continues. 9
While control is the most important factor to be considered, con-
tinuation of the general employment may be indicated by the length
of time the servant is borrowed, 10 the right of the general employer
to substitute at any time another servant for the one loaned," or
the fact that the servant has the skill of a specialist. 12 Another im-
ton Shoe Co., 93 N.H. 428, 43 A.2d 155 (1945); Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R.,
269 N.Y. 219, 199 N.E. 65, 102 A.L.R. 511 (1935); Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y.
127, 135 N.E. 199 (1922); Mature v. Angelo, 373 Pa. 593, 97 A.2d 59 (1953);
Gaston v. Sharpe, 179 Tenn. 609, 16 S.W.2d 784 (1943); Alvey v. Butchkavitz,
196 Va. 447, 84 S.E.2d 535 (1954). The great majority of the cases indicate
that this is the essential question to be answered. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co.
v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909); Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127, 135 N.E.
199 (1922). Dean Ferson says that in effect the question to be asked is always
"was the very act that caused the injury done in serving the alleged master."
FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY 48 (1954); see also, Stevens, The Test of the
Employment Relation, 38 Mc. L. REV. 188 (1939).
5. See, e.g., Case v. Kadota Fig Ass'n of- Producers, 207 P.2d 86 (Cal. App.
1949); Thomas v. Great Western Mining Co., 150 Okla. 212, 1 P.2d 165 (1931);
Gaston v. Sharpe, 179 Tenn. 609, 168 S.W.2d 784 (1943); Sanford v. Keef, 140
Tenn. 368, 204 S.W. 1154 (1918). But see the English rule where control is
not the paramount test, Century Ins. Co. v. Northern Ireland Trans. Bd.,
[1942J A.C. 509 (the great test is-whether the servant was transferred or
only the use and benefit of his work).
6. Linstead v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 276 U.S. 28 (1928); Brown v. Smith,
186 Ga. 274, 12 S.E. 411 (1890); Graalum v. Radisson Ramp Inc., 71 N.W.2d
904 (Minn. 1955); Leeter v. Messick, 92 Ind. App. 264, 173 N.E. 238 (1930);
Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R., 269 N.Y. 219, 199 N.E. 65, 102 A.L.R. 511
(1935); Thomas v. Great Western Mining Co., 150 Okla. 212, 1 P.2d 165 (1931).
7. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909); Doty v. Lacey, 114
Cal. App. 2d 73, 249 P.2d 550 (1952); Densby v. Bartlett, 318 Ill. 616, 149 N.E.
591 (1925); Hassebroch v. Weaver Constr. Co., 67 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 1954).
8. Kelly v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954); FERsON, PRmCIPLES OF
AGENCY §§ 35-37 (1954).
9. United States Steel Corp. v. Mathews, 261 Ala. 120, 73 So. 2d 239 (1954);
Peters v. United Studios, 98 Cal. App. 373, 277 Pac. 156 (1929); Sarris v.
A. A. Pruzick & Co., 37 N.J. Super. 340, 117 A.2d 305 (App. Div. 1955);
Falk v. Unger, 33 N.J, Super. 589, 111 A.2d 283 (App. Div. 1955); Agostini v.
W. J. Halloran Co., 111 A.2d 537 (R.I. 1955); Blessing v. Pittman, 70 Wyo.
416, 251 P.2d 243 (1952).
10. Shepard v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110, 90 N.E. 392, 393 (1910) (dictum);
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220(2) (f) (1933).
11. Lowell v. Harris, 24 Cal. App. 2d 70, 74 P.2d 551 (1938).




portant question is whether the servant was furthering the business of
his general employer in serving the temporary employer.
13
If reasonable minds might not differ on the conclusion to be drawn
from the facts, the question whether the general employment con-
tinued during the performance of "borrowed" services becomes one of
law for the court to decide.14 As each case stands on its own particular
facts, no concrete rules can be formulated. 15 Evidence that another
person was solely responsible for the performance of the work in
which the servant was engaged has not been deemed conclusive proof
of a transfer of control; but in nearly every such case the injuries
for which the general employer was held liable resulted from the
servant's negligent use of a dangerous instrumentality, and the
courts have stressed the importance of this factor.'
6
In the instant case the driver's negligence was purely personal.
The loosening of the chains was clearly an act of unloading, which
by the terms of the contract was to be done by the Bethlehem Steel
Company. There was no specific agreement to transfer the driver
from one employment to another, but usually no such agreement is
deemed necessary.17 Under the contract, defendant had only an
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937) (ultimate
test); Bertino v. Marion Steam Shovel Co., 64 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1933); Byrne
v. Kansas City Ft. S. & M.R.R., 61 Fed. 605 (6th Cir. 1894) (whose work was
the servant doing?); Rockwell v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 253 Mich. 144,
234 N.W. 159 (1931).
14. See Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Angco v. Standard
Oil Co., 66 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1933); Lee Moor Contracting Co. v. Blanton, 49
Ariz. 130, 65 P.2d 35 (1937); Ryder v. Plumley, 138 Fla. 378, 189 So. 422
(1939); Balcus v. Lexington Shoe Co., 93 N.H. 428, 43 A.2d 155 (1945); Cook
v. Knox, 273 P.2d 865 (Okla. 1954).
15. In Christiansen v. Mehlhorn, 146 Wash. 340, 262 Pac. 633 (1928), an action
was brought by an independent contractor against the owner of a building
for injuries sustained because of the negligence of the janitor who ran the
defendant's elevator while plaintiff was painting the elevator shaft. The
court held that surrender of control was conclusively shown by the fact that
the plaintiff had control of the janitor and was directing his activity when the
accident occurred. Many cases have arisen in which the custom of the trade
required the unloading of ships to be done by independent contractor steve-
dores, but the ship was required to furnish winchmen to operate the ship's
winches. In every case the negligence of the winchmen was held chargeable
to the shipowner, but the courts indicate that a different result would be
reached if a contract existed between the shipowners and the stevedores
giving the latter full control of the unloading operation. See The F. B.
Squire, 248 Fed. 469 (2d Cir. 1917), and Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1263 (1928).
16. In Rockwell v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 264 Mich. 626, 250 N.W. 515
(1933), where a statute imposed the duty of unloading on the consignee,
it was held as a matter of law that the operator of a railroad crane loaned to
the consignee by the railroad was in the employment of the consignee during
the unloading process. Under the same federal statute a like result was
reached in Rau v. Wilkes-Barre & E. Ry., 311 Pa. 510, 167 Atl. 230 (1933);
but a contrary result was reached in Ramsey v. New York Cent. R.R., 269
N.Y. 219, 199 N.E. 65 (1935). See also Annot., 102 A.L.R. 514 (1936).
17. See Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346,
144 Atl. 510, 62 A.L.R. 1497 (1929). Where there is a doubtful interpretation
leaving unclear just who is to be the master of the borrowed servant at a
particular time, clearly a jury issue is presented. Krausse v. Decker, 57
S.W.2d 1124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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indirect interest in the unloading; where command has been sur-
rendered, the general employer is no longer liable for the torts of his
employee, notwithstanding that the employee is in a general way
furthering his business.18 Both the majority and dissenting members
of the court agreed that the only question presented in the instant
case was that of control. It would seem that conclusive proof of
surrender of control might be found in the existence of a contract
imposing on Bethlehem the responsibility of unloading the steel and
the uncontradicted testimony of Bethlehem's foreman that he had
taken charge of the operation when the accident occurred.
WILLS-ANTI-LAPSE STATUTES-BENEFICIARIES
OF CLASS GIFT DEAD AT WILL'S EXECUTION
A South Dakota anti-lapse statute' provided that if a devisee or
legatee who is a "child or other relation of the testator... dies before
the testator ... or is dead at the time the will is executed [the sur-
viving lineal descendants of such devisee or legatee take] . . . in the
same manner the devisee or legatee would have done had he survived
the testator." The residuary clause of the will of a native Norwegian
read: "[A]ll the remainder of my estate to all my first cousins." The
will was probated in 1946 in South Dakota and final distribution of the
residue was made among twenty-one of testator's first cousins, not
including those who lived in Norway. Plaintiffs, residents of Norway,
were first cousins of testator and lineal descendants of first cousins
who were dead when the will was executed. Alleging negligence and
fraud, plaintiffs brought an equity action against the executor and
those first cousins of testator who shared in the 1946 distribution. As
to those plaintiffs who were lineal descendants of deceased first cou-
sins, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.2 Held, reversed. The anti-lapse statute applies to a gift to a
class of which some members were dead when the will was executed.
Hoverstad v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 74 N.W.2d 48 (S.D.
1955).
Most states today have statutes designed to prevent lapse of testa-
18. Westover v. Hoover, 88 Neb. 201, 129 N.W. 285 (1911) ; FERSON, PRINCIPLES
OF AGENCY § 4 (1954).
1. S.D. CODE § 56.032 (1939).
2. Plaintiffs prayed that the executor be declared trustee for the plaintiffs
and be held liable for the amount plaintiffs would have receive from the
estate. The court on appeal ordered their adtion, as against the executor,
dismissed without prejudice, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction
and that the equity court could not invoke its powers.
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mentary gifts in certain situations.3 The assumption is that in the
absence, of a disclosure of a contrary intent in the will, testator pre-
ferred that failure of his gifts be prevented. 4 Some of the statutes have
clauses making the anti-lapse provisions applicable to gifts to a class. 5
Further, the majority of the courts interpreting statutes without such
clauses hold them applicable to class gifts.6 The cases are in conflict
as to whether statutes not containing provisions for both class gifts and
beneficiaries dead at the execution of the will are applicable to members
of a class dead when the will was made.7 A few statutes, similar to
the one applied in the principal case, specifically provide against lapse
in cases where the devisee or legatee is dead at the execution of the
will,8 but only three statutes exist today providing for both class gifts
3. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, § 16 (1940); AiZ. CODE ANN. § 41-109 (1939);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 92 (Deering 1949); CoN. GEN. STAT. § 6954 (1949); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.20 (Supp. 1954);
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-812 (1935); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-323 (1948); ILL. ANN.
STAT. C. 3, § 200 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601 (Burns
1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.16 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615 (1949);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.400, 394.410 (Baldwin 1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
c. 169, § 10 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 351 352 (1951) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS
c. 191, § 22 (1955); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(81) (1943); Minx. STAT. ANN,
§ 525.203 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 660 (1943); Mo. REV. STAT. § 468.310
(1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 91-139 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-228.03
(Supp. 1955); NEV. Corav. LAWS § 9922 (Supp. 1941); N.H. REV. LAWS ANN. c.
551. § 12 (1955); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:3-13 (1953); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
§ 29; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-42, 31-42.1, 31-42.2 (Supp. 1955); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 56-0420 (Supp. 1953); OHmO GEN. CODE ANN. § 10504-73 (Baldwin 1940);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 142 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(8) (Purdon
1950); R.I. GEN. LAWS C. 566, § 30 (1938); S.C. CODE § 19-237 (1952); S.D.
CODE § 56.0232 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306 (1955); TEx. PROB. CODE
§ 68 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-1-35 (1953); VT. REV. STAT. § 3064 (1947);
VA. CODE ANN. § 64-64 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.110 (1952); W. VA.
CODE ANN.§ 4054 (1955).
4. AvnasoN, WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1935); Mechem, Some Problems Arising
Under Anti-Lapse Statutes, 19 IOWA L. REV. 1-3 (1933).
5. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §9 394.400, 394.410 (Baldwin 1955): MD. ANN. CODE
art. 93, §§ 351, 352 (1951); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-228.03 (Supp. 1955); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(8) (Purdon 1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306
(1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-64 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4054 (1955).
6. In re Steidl's Estate, 89 Cal. App. 2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948); Clifford
v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 117 Atl. 489 (1922); Kehl v. Taylor, 275 Ill. 346, 114
N.E. 125 (1916); Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196. 142 N.E. 818 (1924);
In re Mott's Estate, 137 Misc. 99, 244 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Woolley
v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1889); ATKINSON, WILLS § 140 (2d ed.
1953).
7. Holding the statute applicable: Kehl v. Taylor, 275 Ill. 346, 114 N.E. 125
(1916); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 249 Ill. App. 98 (1928); Sloan v. Thornton, 102
Ky. 443, 43 S.W. 415 (1897); Bray v. Pullen, 84 Me. 185, 24 Atl. 811 (1892);
Shumaker v. Pearson, 67 Ohio St. 330. 65 N.E. 1005 (1902); Wildberger v.
Cheek's Ex'r, 94 Va. 517, 27 S.E. 441 (1897). Holding the statute not applicable:
Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N.E. 631 (1892); Pimel v. Betjemann,
183 N.Y. 194, 76 N.E. 157 (1905); In re Harrison's Estate, 202 Pa. 331, 51 Atl.
976 (1902); Williams v. Knight, 18 R.I. 333, 27 Atl. 210 (1893); In re Hutton's
Estate, 106 Wash. 578, 180 Pac. 882 (1919).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 92 (Deering 1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.20 (Supp.
1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-81Z (1935); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601 (Burns 1953),
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.400, 394.410 (Baldwin 1955); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 10504-73 (Baldwin 1940); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 74-1-35 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4054 (1955).
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and gifts to a beneficiary who was dead when the will was made.9
The court in the instant case reasoned that an anti-lapse statute is
predicted on the theory that kindred of the testator should be pro-
tected and that disposition of a defeated legacy to the lineal descen-
dants of the legatee is the most equitable distribution.10 Thus, said the
court, the statute should apply to class as well as individual gifts.
Plaintiffs were allowed to share because, being lineal descendants of
beneficiaries dead at the execution of the will, they came within the
express provisions of the act.
If the court accurately defined the purpose of the statute, the holding
is correct. Moreover, if the statute is based on the assumption that
testator would have desired such a distribution, the decision is justified.
If testator knew that some of the members of the class were dead, he
acted either out of perversity or in reliance on the statute. If he did
not know they were dead, distribution to the descendants of the de-
ceased member of the class involves no more speculation as to his
intent than does distribution to descendants of a specific beneficiary.'2
The objection that membership in a class must be determined at some
particular instant, so that persons dead at the execution of the will
cannot be included, seems technical and does not permit the interpre-
tation that testator wished the descendants of these deceased persons
to take.
9. Ky. REv. STAT. A N. §§ 394.400, 394.410 (Baldwin 1955); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-306 (1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4054 (1955). NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-228
(1948) providing for neither was repealed in 1951 and replaced by NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-228.02 (Supp. 1951) which provided for both. This was repealed in
1955 and replaced by NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-228.03 (Supp. 1955) which provided
for gifts to a class (see notes 3, 5 supra).
10. Instant case, 74 N.W.2d at 55.
11. Mechem, Some Problems Arising Under Anti-Lapse Statutes, 19 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1933).
12. Id. at 16.
1956 ]
